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Research into creative insight has had a strong emphasis on the psychological processes
underlying problem-solving situations as a standard model for the empirical study of this
phenomenon. Although this model has produced signiﬁcant advances in our scientiﬁc
understanding of the nature of insight, we believe that a full comprehension of insight
requires complementing cognitive and neuroscientiﬁc studies with a descriptive, ﬁrst-
person, phenomenological approach into how creative insight is experienced. Here we
propose to take such ﬁrst-person perspective while paying special attention to the temporal
aspects of this experience. When this ﬁrst-person perspective is taken into account, a
dynamic past–future interplay can be identiﬁed at the core of the experience of creative
insight, a structure that is compatible with both biological and biographical evidences. We
believe this approach could complement and help bring together biological and psy-
chological perspectives. Furthermore, we argue that because of its spontaneous but
recurrent nature, creative insight could represent a relevant target for the phenomenological
investigation of the ﬂow of experience itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Try to recall the last time you had the experience of a sudden
breakthrough in thinking about some unresolved issue. It can be as
academic, as artistic, or as domestic as you please. This experience
is usually accompanied by a more perceptible, sudden experience
of resolution, which is called the insight into the problem’s nature
(the Aha! experience). Try to recall the feeling of insight itself,
which is sometimes related to a positive feeling that goes beyond
the cognitive restructuring of the problem. Would you agree that,
in some sense, the moment of creative insight involves an embod-
ied expression of surprise and familiarity? Of something that is
at the same time both new (future oriented) and already known
(past oriented)?
The ﬁeld of insight and creativity research is extremely active
(see Runco, 2004; Hennessey and Amabile, 2010; Sawyer, 2012;
Kounios andBeeman,2014; for comprehensive reviews). Although
weplace ourselveswithin the general socio-cultural approach, here
we will focus on one particular aspect of creativity, namely the
experience of creative insight (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995).
Despite the extensive development of research on the psycholog-
ical, cognitive, neuroscientiﬁc, and social aspects of creativity,
it is worth noting that a more descriptive, phenomenological
approach to how creative insight is experienced is still quite lim-
ited (Bindeman, 1998; Nelson, 2005). Here, we will argue that,
when such phenomenological approach is taken into account,
the temporal nuances of the experience of insight are brought
to the fore in a way that has consequences that transcend the
study of creativity. These temporal nuances highlight the past-
oriented and future-looking dimensions of insight. Interestingly,
this temporal structure resembles biological dynamics that span
from brain activity to evolution. Moreover, attention to the
phenomenological structure of insight could help understand the
connections between neurobiological accounts stemming from
cognitive neuroscience and more biographical and psychologi-
cal accounts collected by sociocultural and systems approaches to
creativity (Sawyer, 2012).
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF CREATIVITY AND INSIGHT
It was not until Guilford’s (1950) APA address that the notion
of creativity drew the attention of psychologists as a matter of
scientiﬁc interest (Sternberg andLubart,1999; Sternberg andGrig-
orenko, 2001). Guilford also inspired the study of creativity in
everyday situations by using psychometric methods. Since, diver-
gent thinking tests, such as the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking
(Torrance, 1972), which were based on work by Guilford (1967),
have been extensively used. These tests showparticipants questions
that can be answered in an open way: for example, “List things
that would happen if we lived in a world without gravity.” Many
of these tests are based on verbal stimuli, although they can also
be ﬁgural and involve, for example, the completion of a drawing.
The answers are scored in dimensions such as ﬂuency (how many
responses are produced) and originality (the responses’ unique-
ness), among others. Despite their inﬂuence, divergent thinking
tests have been accused of trivializing the concept of “creativity,”
for reasons we agree with (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999; Stern-
berg and Grigorenko, 2001). Speciﬁcally, the divergent thinking
construct reduces the concept of creativity to a problem solv-
ing process that is restricted to a speciﬁc task and moment in
time. Yet, as illustrated by both descriptive evidence about the cre-
ative process (Bindeman, 1998) and biographical analysis through
case studies (Gruber and Wallace, 1999) or in-depth interviews
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), the generation of a creative product in
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a relevant cultural domain is neither an instantaneous event nor
simply a matter of purely reﬂective problem solving. It is well
known that the acquisition and mastery of specialized knowledge
of the domain, involving a sophisticated interplay between con-
vergent and divergent psychological processes (Goel, 2014) are
necessary to account for real-world creative activity. A case in
point is that of Darwin, who, as documented by Gruber and Wal-
lace (1999), developed four or ﬁve stages of his theory of evolution
from 1831 to 1838, as demonstrated by the record of his obser-
vations and his thinking, which includes both verbal and visual
graphics. The analyses of cases such as that of Darwin illustrate
that “it would be difﬁcult if not impossible to construct the narra-
tive of a case study using only one timescale. Short-term activities
and experiences are embedded within longer episodes, and so on”
(Gruber and Wallace, 1999, p. 104).
Contrasting with the more encompassing problem of creativity
as such, research on the more temporally restricted phenomenon
of insight as an event has a longer history, extending back
to the contributions of the Gestalt movement. It is interest-
ing to note that whereas in its origins the concept of insight
was related to the observation of problem solving behavior in
open-ended situations—such as those observed by Kohler (1925)
with chimpanzees—by the end of the 20th century it was mostly
assessed in experimental contexts through closed-ended prob-
lems. Thus, creative insight became mainly conceptualized as a
speciﬁc type of problem-solving process, speciﬁcally, one that is
not lived incrementally but is rather characterized by an impasse
and a sudden, abrupt, and unpredictable reconﬁguration of the
problem (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987; Sternberg and Davidson,
1995). Because it involves a non-analytical strategy that mobilizes
both explicit and implicit processes to produce usually unexpected
solutions, insight has been considered a core element of creative
problem solving. In many occasions, this has led to culturally
equating insightwith creativity itself (see Sawyer, 2012 for a critical
view).
From Wallas’s four-stage model of preparation, incubation,
illumination, and veriﬁcation (Wallas, 1926, in Hélie and Sun,
2010), to recent work in psychology of insight and intuition,
there is a wide agreement that ﬁnding creative solutions, despite
being usually characterized by a sudden and holistic “Aha!” is
not exhausted by this local, more overwhelming aspect of the
experience. As mentioned above, the importance of systematic
involvement and expertise in the domain of knowledge as con-
ditions that make successful insight-based solutions possible are
well known (Runco, 2004; Hennessey and Amabile, 2010; Sawyer,
2012). Likewise, the facilitating effect of incubation periods, where
the question is put to rest, has been consistently reported (Sio and
Ormerod, 2009; Hélie and Sun, 2010; Baird et al., 2012). Further-
more, it is noteworthy that in many insight-type problem solving
tasks, subjects use back-and-forth iterative formulation of pos-
sible solutions that are associated with smaller, partial insights
(Schooler et al., 1993; Bowden et al., 2005; Hélie and Sun, 2010).
These studies show that the time leading up to the moment
of insight can be as important as the insight experience itself,
by providing the relevant conditions and the (mostly implicit)
interpretative context where the Aha!-experience makes sense
(see Elements for A Phenomenology of Creative Insight). This
is consistent with work in the cognitive neuroscience of insight
showing that resting-state brain activity prior to solving a prob-
lem can be used to predict whether it will be solved through insight
or non-insight strategies (Kounios et al., 2006, 2008). It has also
been shown that the likelihood of producing insightful solutions
can be modulated by internal states such as mood and attentional
distribution (Subramaniam et al., 2009).
As much as the abovementioned approaches have contributed
to a more comprehensive understanding of creative insight
from process-based psychological and sociological approaches, a
descriptive, phenomenological investigation into the way insight
is experienced subjectively remains surprisingly underdeveloped
(Bindeman, 1998; Nelson, 2005). One can only speculate about
the reasons for this neglect, some of which are probably related
to the underprivileged status ﬁrst-person data has historically
had in the cognitive sciences (Varela and Shear, 1999). However,
the tide is slowly turning with mainstream journals publishing
studies that take advantage of systematic, rigorous ﬁrst-person
descriptions to guide empirical questions and analysis (Lutz et al.,
2002; David et al., 2003; Cosmelli and Thompson, 2007; Christoff
et al., 2009). Even if a phenomenological description does not
manage, eventually, to bridge the biological, behavioral, and
psychological perspectives (Petitot et al., 2000; Schwartz and Met-
calfe, 2011), it could provide relevant analogies or heuristics to
expand our understanding of this deeply signiﬁcant experience
(Sass, 2001).
ELEMENTS FOR A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CREATIVE INSIGHT
Consider again how the sudden “Aha!” is experienced during
creative insight. Among other aspects, this moment is usually
accompanied by a positive affective feeling of something “com-
ing together,”“making sense,” or somehow“falling into place” (see
also Schooler et al., 1995, pp. 578–579). From a cognitive psychol-
ogy approach, this feeling has been proposed to be dependent on
a sudden gain in processing ﬂuency (Topolinski and Reber, 2010).
From a phenomenological perspective, this moment reveals two
complementary aspects of how the experience unfolds in time.
On the one hand, the felt relevance of an answer obtained
through insight (independent of its eventual correctness) is always
related in a co-generative manner to a prior “wanting” or “lack-
ing” context to which such answer responds. Accordingly, insight
solutions are commonly experienced as “gap-ﬁlling” (Gruber,
1995; see also Pelaprat and Cole, 2011 for a convergent view
regarding imagination), something that can only make experi-
ential sense if both ends of the gap are available at some point
of the process (Hélie and Sun, 2010). By virtue of this gap ﬁll-
ing, the moment of insight brings with it a very strong and
sharp reference to what was going on the moment before. In
Runco’s words, “A creative insight is not a quick “aha!” but
instead is protracted” (Runco, 2004, p. 662). In this sense, the
moment of insight bears a notable resemblance to the resolu-
tion of the tip-of-the-tongue experience. It has been proposed
that in such cases, this could be associated with succeeding
in bringing forth phonological information to match a con-
text of previously activated but incomplete semantic information
(Gollan and Brown, 2006). During linear, incremental reasoning
the prior context is transparent and fully available in a manner
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that does not depend on subsequent steps in the thought process.
In contrast, when the solution emerges during insight, it retro-
spectively illuminates the previously opaque context, and makes
sense by referring to something that was, until a moment ago,
unavailable. In doing so it highlights how the present and the
immediate-past are deeply intertwined in the formation of novel
meaning.
On the other hand,when the experience of creative insight hap-
pens it does not only solve or close a previously posed problem.
Both in controlled problem solving settings and during sponta-
neous insights (those unrelated to a speciﬁc contextual problem), it
is important to differentiate another aspect of its temporality, one
that has received much less attention, especially from the cognitive
neurosciences. Insight solutions are creative not only because they
solve a given problem in an unexpected and novel way. They are
also creative because they can (and usually do) involve a change in
the perception or representation of the problem itself (also known
as restructuring, see Weisberg, 1995; Chi, 1997). As such, creative
insight can open up a potential set of new problems by chang-
ing the way the current problem is interpreted vis-à-vis its future
consequences.
In contrast to the gap-ﬁlling, past-oriented side, this future-
oriented aspect is most clearly illustrated through biograph-
ical accounts of spontaneous insight, and interviews with
individuals—in many cases famous scientists—that discover a
new way of looking at an old problem or produce a theoretical
synthesis of previously unrelated phenomena, (Csikszentmihalyi
and Sawyer, 1995; Gruber, 1995). Poincaré’s description of the
consequences of intuiting the order revealed by a mathematical
demonstration is illustrative: “A mathematical demonstration is
not a simple juxtaposition of syllogisms, it is syllogisms placed in
a certain order, and the order in which these elements are placed
is much more important than the elements themselves. If I have
the feeling, the intuition, so to speak, of this order, so as to per-
ceive at a glance the reasoning as a whole, I need no longer fear
lest I forget one of the elements, for each of them will take its
allotted place in the array, and that without any effort of mem-
ory on my part” (Poincaré, 1910, p. 324). And as he goes on to
say when speaking about individual differences in mathematical
ability: “Others, ﬁnally, will possess in a less or greater degree the
special intuition referred to, and then not only can they under-
stand mathematics even if their memory is nothing extraordinary,
but they may become creators and try to invent with more or less
success according as this intuition is more or less developed in
them.” Phenomenologically speaking, more than the knowledge
just gained, this generative, forward-looking aspect of the expe-
rience emphasizes the direction (or rather potential directions)
toward which one is left facing, so to speak, as a consequence
of one’s insight into the problem’s nature. During spontaneous
insight this aspect of creative insight can be very powerful as
one’s ﬂow of experience becomes unexpectedly diverted toward
the consequences of the realization.
It is worth considering that the two-sided past-closing/future-
opening structure is analogous across other levels of organization.
For instance, it is consistent with the view of the brain and
body as a system driven mainly by endogenous, historically
dependent dynamics, which support action perception cycles by
continuously minimizing prediction errors (Friston, 2005; Clark,
2013). As pointed out by neurodynamicists reaching back to Karl
Lashley, it makes no sense to analyze neural activity purely as
happening instantaneously or just as a reaction to impinging
stimuli, while ignoring its ongoing, predictive nature (Freeman,
2000; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Raichle and Gusnard, 2005;
Cosmelli et al., 2007). In other words, ongoing brain activity cre-
atively preﬁgures virtual, motor and perceptual possibilities by
continuously bringing forth our history of interactions into the
present “now” (Varela, 2000). Or consider the dynamics of bio-
logical evolution, whose similarities with creativity and insight
have been pointed out previously (Simonton, 1999, 2013). For
example, in an analogous way to what happens during restruc-
turing, it can be argued that, evolutionarily, ﬂying is not just a
prior problem waiting to be solved with wings or membranous
forelimbs (as in bats, see Sears et al., 2006). Flying is also possible
as a set of new problems because wings or membranous forelimbs
are available. Evolution is not exhausted by pure random varia-
tion; it is the emergence of novelty within boundary conditions,
conditions that are (self) affected precisely by that which emerges.
It is tempting to think that such analogies might point to underly-
ing common mechanisms in biological systems (see also Perkins,
1995).
CONSEQUENCES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Webelieve that the previous analysis has anumber of consequences
that are relevant for studies on creative insight, but also for a
phenomenology of the ﬂow of experience. Take for instance the
past-oriented, gap-ﬁlling aspect. Aswediscussed above, it brings to
the fore in a very palpable manner, the intimate relation that exists
between the present and the immediate past in experience (James,
2007; ﬁrst edition-1890). Such past-looking, retentive aspect that
is always available in the experience of the present “now” has been
consistently described in the phenomenological philosophy tradi-
tion (Merleau-Ponty, 1976; Husserl, 1991; Sherover, 2001) and has
been proposed to play a role in providing unity to the ﬂow of expe-
rience (Varela, 2000). The fact that it is made so evident during the
“Aha!” moment is what we wish to highlight here: it suggests that
spontaneous occurrences of insight situations could be a natural
target for the phenomenological inquiry into the ongoing ﬂow
of experience. One of the difﬁculties faced by phenomenological
investigation is pinpointing the object of description, especially
when its appearance is unpredictable. By providing a recogniz-
able, easily relatable, “anchor point,” creative insight can facilitate
taking a phenomenological attitude toward a well-deﬁned tar-
get that preserves the spontaneity of the ﬂow of experience.
In this sense, it could play a role similar to that proposed by
Schwartz and Metcalfe (2011) for tip-of-the-tongue experiences,
becoming a natural candidate for phenomenological study that
can be contrasted with psychological, cognitive or neuroscientiﬁc
accounts.
It remains an open question whether a more in-depth explo-
ration of the moments leading up to the experience of sudden
insight can be the subject of phenomenological investigation, for
the sake of understanding creative insight itself. As studies since
Metcalfe and Metcalfe and Wiebe’s (1987) seminal work have
shown much of what is going on during the incubation period
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prior to the moment of the Aha! experience is not accessible to
the subject. This would in principle challenge the utility of phe-
nomenological descriptions of this moment of the experience.
However, one need not stay exclusively with the phenomeno-
logical approach. That resting state activity prior to confronting
a problem can, in principle, predict whether a problem will
be solved through insight or not suggests a possible strategy.
Consider the proliferation of signal analysis algorithms that are
currently available for ongoing EEG decomposition in the context
of brain–computer interfacedevelopment (Krusienski et al.,2011).
Subjects could be prompted for descriptions of their ongoing
experience when characteristic features of brain activity associ-
ated with insight solutions (i.e., changes in peak frequency in the
low alpha band or drop in alpha band power over mid frontal
and left anterior temporal regions, see Kounios et al., 2006) are
detected. In particular, the locus of attention could be a rele-
vant target as it has been proposed that a diffuse distribution of
visual attention might be a characteristic feature of insight-based
solutions (Kounios et al., 2008, p. 283, see also Subramaniam
et al., 2009). This would be a brain activity-based sophisti-
cation of the strategy used originally by Metcalfe and Wiebe
(1987), whereby subjects were asked at different moments prior
to the Aha! experience to evaluate their feeling of approaching a
solution.
The more future-oriented, protentive side of insight, on the
other hand, underscores the self-affecting nature of experience in
a very clear way. Restructuring implies that the problem takes its
ﬁnal form (meaning, consequences, etc.) only when the solution is
discovered. As such, it suggests that the less studied restructuring
aspect could be a relevant focus, for example, when seen in a more
learning oriented setting. Most psychological and cognitive neu-
roscience studies have dealt with those mental or brain processes
leading up to or facilitating the moment of restructuring (Met-
calfe and Wiebe, 1987; Bowden et al., 2005; Kounios et al., 2008;
Kounios and Beeman, 2009; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Eubanks
et al., 2010). However, much less is known regarding the conse-
quences of restructuring for future, possibly recurrent encounters
with similar problems. For instance, it would be interesting to
study if and under which conditions repetitive exposure to certain
type of insight problems can eventually lead to generalizations or
the development of strategies to deal with them (see alsoWeisberg,
1995 and Eubanks et al., 2010). If this restructuring aspect, which
is more clearly available in understanding-type insights (Gruber,
1995), is characteristic of creative insight in general, one would
predict that every instance of closed-problem insightful resolu-
tion would change to some degree the way the problem is judged.
Such change might be small and difﬁcult to detect for each indi-
vidual event, but if it exists, it would be reasonable to expect that at
some point of recurrent encounter with a given type of such prob-
lems, some kind of meta-insight regarding the underlying logic
should become available to the person. This expertise-related pre-
diction should, in principle, be amenable to experimental testing
with current problem-solving based approaches both in terms of
changes in behavior and in brain activity.
An obvious limitation of any phenomenological enterprise is
that it deals, by deﬁnition, with experience as described by the
same subject of that experience. Here we have taken this as a
starting point but we have strived to triangulate our observations
with psychological studies and cognitive neuroscience results in
the spirit of cross-validation. We believe that the results of this tri-
angulation are encouraging and point to potentially relevant lines
for further inquiry. In the limited space of this essay we cannot
tackle a full-ﬂedged phenomenological investigation into creative
insight. We have, however, focused on a two outstanding aspects
that warrant further attention not only from a phenomenologi-
cal perspective but also in terms of psychological and biological
approaches. These descriptions are open to contrast with other
researcher’s experience on the one hand, and with future results
from experimental approaches on the other. By its very nature,
phenomenological investigation has to start from the individual
and seek intersubjective contrast, reﬁnement, and eventually, vali-
dation. The perspective here adopted aims to invite others to adopt
a much-needed phenomenological stance in order to contribute
to the understanding of the experience of creative insight.
We have argued here that creativity in general—and insight
in particular—offers an extremely rich case, phenomenologically
speaking, for the study of the temporal structure of human experi-
ence, one that represents a challenging venue of research. Indeed,
creative insight brings forth and coherently embodies the future-
past polarity of experience in a very explicit way. As such, it is at
the same time the experience of something surprisingly novel but
profoundly familiar.
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